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Abstract
The traditional territorially oriented concept of sovereignty is engaged in a particularly slow
and problematical reconciliation with current developments in outer space. This Note will trace
the concept of sovereignty as it has evolved into the space age. An examination of early debates
regarding sovereignty in outer space reveals that the traditional territorial orientation is slowly
being abandoned. Analysis of current issues indicates that while a significant conservative view-
point continues to exist, a new non-territorial orientation is emerging. This Note will consider the
proposition that it is this new non-territorially oriented sovereignty that is viable for outer space.
THE EVOLUTION OF A NEW AND
VIABLE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
FOR OUTER SPACE
INTRODUCTION
The recent activities of mankind in outer space have raised se-
rious challenges to the status quo of many of civilization's endeav-
ors.' The challenge is an obvious one in the area of scientific re-
search 2 and it is similarly apparent in the areas of transportation
and communications. 3 Unfortunately, adaptation of legal principles
to the developments of progress in outer space has been difficult. 4
It has nevertheless been recognized that outer space must be gov-
erned by a legal framework.5 In order for such a framework to be
effective, legal principles must evolve in close conjunction with
outer space activities. 6
The traditional territorially oriented concept of sovereignty 7 is
engaged in a particularly slow and problematical reconciliation with
1. See generally Busak, Space Telecommunications at Present and in Future,
22ND. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 29 (1979); Menter, Status of In-
ternational Space Flight, Id. at 67; Safavi, The Legal Aspect Concerning Solar En-
ergy, 21ST. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 67 (1978); Vinogradov,
Outer Space Activities and Environmental Protection, 22ND. COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 241 (1979).
2. "The progress of science and technology cannot but influence the develop-
ment of international law." INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 22 (B. Belitsky ed. 1976).
See J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 204-06 (8th ed. 1977).
3. "The accumulating changes in the community of man in space will undoubt-
edly carry with them more profound consequences than simple extension of the dis-
tances traversed by man or by his systems of communication." M. McDOUGAL, H.
LASSWELL & I. VLASIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 3 (1963). The impact of
developments in space technology was thus apparent even in the early years of
space exploration.
4. J. STARKE, supra note 2, at 206.
5. See, e.g., id. at 23. Note that in recognition of the need for a legal framework
for outer space the 1980 Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition dealt
with outer space law. See 4 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. - (1980).
6. See C. JENKS, SPACE LAW 6 (1965); DeSaussure, An Integrated Legal System
for Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 179, 180 (1978).
7. See notes 10-16 infra and accompanying text.
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current developments in outer space. 8 This Note will trace the con-
cept of sovereignty as it has evolved into the space age. 9 An exami-
nation of early debates regarding sovereignty in outer space reveals
that the traditional territorial orientation is slowly being aban-
doned. Analysis of current issues indicates that while a significant
conservative viewpoint continues to exist, a new non-territorial ori-
entation is emerging. This Note will consider the proposition that it




Sovereignty is the legal principle by which states exercise the
exclusive control of a supreme authority' over territory." Through-
out history, for a variety of political, economic and social reasons,
one of the primary activities engaged in by states and their histor-
ical precursors has been fierce competition to acquire territory. 12
Although sovereignty is merely a concept, it has been universally
applied in order to protect and maintain state control within each
state's boundaries. 13 The result has been that sovereignty accentu-
ates the boundaries between states and protects states' rights from
the exercise of control by all other states.14
Given the realities of a civilization in which the nation-state is
the subject of international law and in which the nation-state is
8. See Goedhuis, Influence of the Conquest of Outer Space on National Sover-
eignty: Some Observations, 6 J. SPACE L. 37 (1978).
9. The space age is deemed to have begun in 1957 when the Soviet Union suc-
cessfully launched the first Sputnik into outer space. See C. JENKS, supra note 6, at
21; J. STARKE, supra note 2, at 205.
10. For a discussion of sovereignty in terms of absolute power, see J. BRIERLY,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 7-16 (6th ed. 1963). For a discussion of sovereignty in terms
of supreme authority, see H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 581-84
(2d ed. 1966).
11. "[A] state occupies a definite part of the surface of the earth, within which
it normally exercises, subject to the limitations imposed by international law, juris-
diction over persons and things to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of all other
states." J. BRIERLY, supra note 10, at 162.
12. For an historical discussion of the relation between sovereignty and terri-
tory, see G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
51-54, 96-100 (6th ed. 1976).
13. Id. at 51-52.
14. Id. at 52-54.
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limited to those activities conducted within the territorial bounda-
ries of earth, territorial sovereignty is an inherently appropriate
principle by which to protect state rights. 15 As mankind ventures
into outer space, however, the applicability of traditional principles
based on earthly realities becomes questionable. While the applica-
bility of a conceptual principle such as territorial sovereignty can
be debated at length, discussion has centered on prior consent as
the operative mechanism by which sovereignty is exercised. 16
B. Prior Consent-The Operative Mechanism
Prior consent was the fundamental operative mechanism of in-
ternational law before the space age. 1 7 Prior consent is directly re-
lated to the concept of territorial sovereignty. It is the basis of
agreements which provide for the exercise of state sovereignty out-
side state territory. 18 In addition, prior consent enables states to
selectively choose those areas in which to engage in international
cooperation and those states with which to cooperate. 19 Thus the
state maintains exclusive control within its territory, exchanging or
relinquishing rights, only by means of prior consent, and only
when in the state's best interest.20 This process of selective choice,
in upholding the rights of the nation-state, fosters the continuance
of the nation-state perspective and somewhat minimizes the pros-
pects of international cooperation. 21 Prior consent, as the operative
mechanism of territorial sovereignty, thus may be seen as a barrier
to multilateral agreements in the interest of the community. Prior
consent is a fundamental and integral part of territorial sover-
eignty,22 but it is rendered inoperative in outer space because the
application of territorial sovereignty is so problematic.
15. See W. LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CONCISE INTRO-
DUCTION 145 (1979).
16. It has long been established that international law is founded on customary
law which is derived primarily from the common consent of members of the interna-
tional community. See L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 123 (2d ed. 1979).
17. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 12, at 36.
18. Id. at 54.
19. W. LEVI, supra note 15, at 89-90, 210.
20. For a discussion of international relations in terms of interests, see Lewis,
Nations Aren't Friends, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1980, at 19, col. 5.
21. "State sovereignty is one of the seven fundamental principles of interna-
tional law. Yet it also constitutes a potent guarantee of the supremacy of the use of
force in international relations." G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 12,
at 54.
22. See notes 23-43 infra and accompanying text.
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II. SOVEREIGNTY IN OUTER SPACE
A. Airspace or Outer Space
During the first decade of space exploration it became immi-
nent that the future of mankind would be at least partially expe-
rienced in outer space.23 This is evidenced by Article I of the 1967
Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).2 4 Article I sets forth:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries . . . and shall be the province of all
mankind. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States .... 25
This early provision regulating exploration and use does ac-
knowledge future activity, but outer space has added a dimension
previously unknown to our civilization. It was clearly recognized
that attempts to apply traditional legal concepts to new experiences
would raise issues for debate.26 Such attempts were greatly influ-
enced by the nation-state perspective and by the concept of territo-
rial sovereignty.
One of the first issues to be debated at the beginning of the
space age was the definition and/or delimitation of outer space. 27
23. "The breakthrough which has taken man into orbit and his instruments to
the Moon and the neighbourhood of the nearer planets has already occurred. How
much more may lie ahead, and when further developments will occur, remains un-
known." C. JENKS, supra note 6, at 29. The volume of on-going space exploration
would appear to indicate that such imminence continues to prevail.
24. The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed
Jan. 27, 1967, and entered into force Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347
[hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty]. The treaty has been signed by more than
75 states including the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Japan
and Canada. See generally Adams, The Outer Space Treaty: An Interpretation in
Light of the No-Sovereignty Provision, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 140 (1968); Bakotic, Some
Questions (Without Answers) Concerning the Consent of States to be Bound by
Treaties Governing Activities in Outer Space, 22ND. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 91 (1979); Gorove, Interpreting Article II of the Outer Space Treaty,
37 FORDHAM L. REV. 349 (1969).
25. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. I.
26. See C. JENKS, supra note 6, at 192-94.
27. See Perek, Scientific Criteria for the Delimitation of Outer Space, 5 J.
SPACE L. 111 (1977); Smirnoff, The Delimitation of Space and Airspace as an Impor-
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As a point of departure, the debate considered Article I of the 1944
Convention on International Aviation (Chicago Convention).28 Arti-
cle I of the convention provides in part: "every State has complete
and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory." 29
The provision was basically open to two interpretations. One was
that it could be extended to apply to outer space, and that a state
would have sovereignty not only over the airspace, but over the
outer space above its territory. 30 The other was that states have
sovereignty over the airspace only, and not the outer space. 31 This
posed the problem of determining where airspace ends and outer
space begins. 32 Although precise delimitation of airspace and outer
space remains an unanswered question, a consensus has been
reached that the Chicago Convention applies only to airspace, and
sovereignty does not extend into the depths of outer space. 33 Aside
from the Outer Space Treaty establishing outer space as the "prov-
ince of all mankind," 34 it is generally agreed that "the very rotation
of the earth and the difficulties involved in controlling far distant
regions make the proposition that sovereignty should extend up-
ward indefinitely an impracticable, if not impossible, and meaning-
less abstraction. "35
B. Sovereignty or National Appropriation
One of the more heated debates of recent years involves the
interpretation of the most controversial provision of the Outer
tant Problem of Cosmic Law, 21ST. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
101 (1978).
28. Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed Dec. 7, 1944, and en-
tered into force Apr. 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
29. Id. art. I.
30. DeSaussure, supra note 6, at 181.
31. Id.
32. The extent to which national sovereignty extends into air space has been
the subject of various United States cases. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946) (distinction between private and public domain); United States v.
Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950) (consideration of whether the United
States has jurisdiction over crimes on board United States aircraft in flight over the
high seas).
33. See C. JENKS, supra note 6, at 97-99; Goedhuis, supra note 8, at 37; Matte,
Introductory Comments on the Aerospace Medium, 20TH. COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 47, 50 (1977); Rosenfield, Where Air Space Ends and Outer
Space Begins, 7 J. SPACE L. 137 (1979).
34. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. I.
35. S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 15
(1977).
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Space Treaty.36 Article II states: "Outer space, including the Moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means." 37 This provision has been the subject of much
discussion in an attempt to determine the role of sovereignty in
outer space. 38 While the provision has often been interpreted to
mean that sovereignty is prohibited, 39 careful analysis reveals that
this is not the case.
It is national appropriation, not sovereignty, that is prohibited
by the Outer Space Treaty. 40 National appropriation indicates a
taking by the nation-state, a taking beyond casual use, implying an
air of permanence and exclusivity. 41 Thus national appropriation is
simply a manifestation of territorial sovereignty. The Outer Space
Treaty, in prohibiting "national appropriation by claim of sover-
eignty," 42 is addressing itself directly to the traditional concept of
sovereignty that has throughout history enabled states to exercise
exclusive control over newly acquired territory. The Treaty's prohi-
bition of national appropriation effectively constitutes recognition
that the exercise of territorial sovereignty in outer space does not
serve the interests of freedom of exploration and use,43 and is
therefore not viable for outer space.
Sovereignty, in its non-territorial sense, for the purposes of
exercising control over space vehicles and personnel, and for estab-
lishing liabilities, is certainly not prohibited. 44 In fact, it is specifi-
cally provided for in the Outer Space Treaty45 and in a number of
36. See, e.g., id. at 79-84; Haanappel, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and
the Status of the Geostationary Orbit, 21ST. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 28 (1978).
37. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. II.
38. See, e.g., Gorove, Legal Aspects of the Space Shuttle, 13 INT'L LAw. 153,
161 n.33 (1979).
39. "[T]here is a general belief ... that sovereignty has been completely abol-
ished in relation to outer space .... " S. GOROVE, supra note 35, at 45.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 82-84.
42. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. II.
43. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
44. S. GOROVE, supra note 35, at 45, 82-84.
45. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, art. VI: "States Parties to the Treaty
shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space .... " Art.
VII: "Each State Party . . . is internationally liable for damage .... " Art. VIII: "A
State Party ... shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and any person-
nel .... "
OUTER SPACE
other outer space agreements. 46 The provisions in these various
agreements clearly preclude the strict interpretation that sover-
eignty itself is prohibited by Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.
A strict interpretation would imply that even a temporary and non-
exclusive occupation or use by a space object or vehicle would be
prohibited. 47 Since such a prohibition would effectively defeat any
endeavor of exploration or use, 48 it is evident that sovereignty
plays an important, non-territorial role in outer space and cannot
be prohibited. 49
C. Current Issues-Remote Sensing and Direct
Broadcasting by Satellites
Within the course of the early debate concerning airspace or
outer space, 50 a consensus was reached that orbiting satellites are
situated entirely in outer space. 51 The consequence of such a con-
sensus is that orbiting satellites are beyond the reach of territorial
sovereignty. In fact, no state has raised any legal objections to or-
biting satellites. 52
Recently, however, states have become increasingly engaged
in new and more sophisticated satellite activities such as remote
sensing53 and direct broadcasting. 54 These activities have serious
46. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, signed Apr. 22, 1968, and entered
into force Dec. 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599 (over 70 states are party to
the agreement); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, signed Mar. 29, 1972, and entered into force Oct. 9, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389,
T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (over 50 states are party to the convention).
47. See Gorove, supra note 38, at 161.
t8. Not only would sophisticated development or exploitation of planet sur-
faces be prohibited, but transitory occupation of space by a satellite or space vehicle
would be prohibited as well.
49. See Gorove, supra note 38, at 161.
50. See notes 27-35 supra and accompanying text.
51. See Gorove, Sovereign Rights in Outer Space, 20TH. COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 244, 245 (1977); Perek, supra note 27, at 112; Vereshchetin,
On the Principle of State Sovereignty in International Space Law, 2 ANNALS OF AIR
& SPACE L. 429, 429-30 (1977). See also Goedhuis, Some Observations on the Prob-
lem of the Definition and/or Delimitation of Outer Space, id. at 287, 308; McDougal,
The Emerging Customary Law of Space, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 618, 631 (1964).
52. S. LAY & H. TAUBENFELD, THE LAW RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF
MAN IN SPACE 37-62 (1970); McDougal, supra note 51, at 632; Wiewiorowska, Legal
and Political Problems of the Geostationary Orbit, 21ST. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 34, 38 (1978).
53. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
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legal significance, derived from the fact that while a satellite en-
gaged in remote sensing or direct broadcasting may be in orbit in
outer space, its function is to cross the line between airspace and
outer space, delimited or not, and penetrate into actual state terri-
tory. 55 Thus, such satellite activities now raise questions as to
whether traditional legal rules regarding consent and sovereignty
should be applied in order to regulate outer space activities which
have an impact on earth.
Nearly all attempts to regulate remote sensing or direct broad-
casting have failed due to fundamental disagreement as to whether
prior consent, the operative mechanism of territorial sovereignty, 56
should be required. 57 A primary example of this disagreement is
the United States' refusal to sign the 1972 UNESCO Declaration of
Guiding Principles on the Free Flow of Information, The Spread of
Education and Cultural Exchange 58 which stipulates in Article IX:
"It is necessary that states reach or promote prior agreements con-
cerning direct satellite broadcasting." 59
To fully understand the controversy one might consider the
1975 principles elaborated by the UN Working Group on direct
television broadcastingY0 which set forth two alternative provi-
(UNCOPUOS) defined remote sensing as "a system of methods for identifying the
nature and/or determining the conditions of objects on the earth's surface and of phe-
nomena on, below or above it, by means of observations from airborne or spaceborne
platforms." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/98, Jan. 20, 1972, reprinted in part in Reijnen, Re-
mote Sensing by Satellites and Legality, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING
FROM OUTER SPACE 19, 19 (N. Matte & H. DeSaussure eds. 1976).
54. The I.T.U. World Administrative Radio Conference-Space Telecom-
munications (WARC-ST) defined a direct Broadcast Satellite Service as "a radiocom-
munication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations
are intended for direct reception by the general public." signed Jul. 17, 1971, and
entered into force Jan. 1, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 1527, 1573, T.I.A.S. No. 7435.
55. For a collection of discussions on remote sensing, see LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
OF REMOTE SENSING FROM OUTER SPACE, supra note 53. For a discussion of direct
broadcasting, see Chapman and Warren, Direct Broadcast Satellites: the ITU, UN
and the Real World!, 4 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 413 (1979).
56. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
57. See Galloway, Direct Broadcast Satellites and Space Law, 3 J. SPACE L. 3,
16 (1975); N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW 145-46 (1977).
58. UNESCO Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/109, Feb. 16, 1973, reprinted in
1 J. SPACE L. 161 (1973).
59. Id. art. IX.
60. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS), Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the Work of Its Fourteenth
Session, Report of the Chairman of Working Group II, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/147, An-
nex II, Mar. 11, 1975, reprinted in B. SIGNITZER, REGULATION OF DIRECT BROAD-
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sions: A) "Direct television broadcasting by means of artificial earth
satellites specifically aimed at a foreign State shall require the
consent of that State," and B) "The consent of any State in which
broadcasting is received is not required ....- "61 The two alterna-
tives reflect the inability of the international community to reach a
consensus on the role of prior consent in outer space. Neverthe-
less, such opposing views with regard to prior consent are merely
the practical manifestations of the more fundamental, conceptual
disagreement as to whether territorial sovereignty should govern
outer space activities.
III. THE CONSERVATIVE VIEWPOINT-
THE BOGOTA DECLARATION AND THE EXERCISE
OF SOVEREIGNTY TO PROTECT STATES' RIGHTS
The most extreme example of a conservative attempt to apply
territorially oriented sovereignty in outer space is the 1976 Bogota
Declaration. 62 Eight equatorial states6 3 declared: "[T]he synchro-
nous geostationary orbit is a physical fact arising from the nature of
our planet, because its existence depends exclusively on its relation
to gravitational phenomena caused by the Earth, and that for that
reason it must not be considered part of outer space. '" The geo-
stationary orbit is situated 35,787 kilometers above the earth's
equator.6 5 Satellites placed in this orbit turn about the polar axis in
CASTING FROM SATELLITES 87 (1976). These principles were an elaboration of pro-
posals submitted by several states and the alternative provisions reflect the complete
non-agreement of proposed provisions regarding prior consent. Working Group II
has since developed a set of Draft Principles which similarly reflect the international
community's inability to agree on the role of prior consent in direct broadcasting.
The Draft Principles acknowledge the benefits of direct television broadcasting for
all mankind yet they also provide that direct television broadcasting "shall be based
on appropriate agreements and/or arrangements between the broadcasting and
receiving States .... " Draft Principles on Direct Television Broadcasting, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/218, Annex II, Apr. 13, 1978, reprinted in part in Note, Toward the Free
Flow of !nformation: Direct Television Broadcasting via Satellite, 13 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 329, 349 (1979).
61. B. SIGNITZER, supra note 60, at 89-90.
62. The Bogota Declaration, signed Dec. 3, 1976, I.T.U. Doc. No. 81-E, Annex
4, Jan. 17, 1977 reprinted in 6 J. SPACE L. 193 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bogota
Dec.].
63. Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and Brazil as'
an observer. Note that Ecuador, Uganda and Brazil are parties to the Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 24.
64. Bogota Dec., supra note 62, art. I.
65. Id.; see Physical, Natural and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Or-
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the same direction and in the same time period as the rotation of
the earth. 66 There are, therefore, a limited number of available po-
sitions for satellites. 67 Due to the finite number of available posi-
tions, the eight equatorial states claim that the geostationary orbit
is a limited natural resource and that each equatorial state there-
fore retains sovereignty over that portion of the orbit situated di-
rectly above that state. 68
The exercise of sovereignty over resources was established by
the 1962 General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
over Resources. 69 In addition, the 1973 International Telecom-
munications Union Convention 70 provides: "radio frequencies and
the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources." 71
Many authorities agree that the geostationary orbit is a natural
resource but contend that it is nevertheless in outer space and
therefore not subject to national appropriation. 72 In support of this
view it is noted that Article 33 of the 1973 I.T.U. Convention also
states that the geostationary orbit "must be used efficiently and
economically so that countries or groups of countries may have eq-
uitable access .... "73 In conjunction with this view, one author
emphasizes that "rational use of the geostationary satellite orbit
bit, Study Prepared by the Secretariat for UNCOPUOS, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/203,
Sec. 2, Aug. 29, 1977.
66. See Physical, Natural and Technical Attributes of the Geostationary Orbit,
supra note 65, § 1; See also Gorbiel, Legal Status of the Geostationary Orbit: Some
Remarks, 6 J. SPACE L. 171 (1978); Wiewiorowska, supra note 52, at 34.
67. See Gorbiel, supra note 66; Wiewiorowska, supra note 52.
68. Bogota Dec., supra note 62, art. I. See Arzinger, The Freedom of Outer
Space and the Geostationary Orbit, 21ST. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 12 (1978); Galloway, The Current Status of the Controversy over the
Geostationary Orbit, id. at 22.
69. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, UNGA Res. 1803, art. I:
"The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth
and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development ....
17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15 (1948), reprinted in DOCUMENTS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 140 (2d ed. I. Brownlie ed. 1972).
70. International Telecommunications Convention, signed Oct. 25, 1973, and
entered into force Apr. 7, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter cited
as I.T.U. Convention].
71. Id. art. 33. UNGA Res. 1803 and the I.T.U. Convention are the documents
most often cited in support of the view that the geostationary orbit is a limited natu-
ral resource and therefore subject to territorial sovereignty.
72. See, e.g., 1 N. JASENTULIYANA, MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 222 (1979); Busak,
supra note 1, at 31-32; Galloway, supra note 68, at 23.
73. I.T.U. Convention, supra note 70, art. 33. Note that Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Indonesia and Zaire are parties to the I.T.U. Convention and the Bogota
Dec., supra note 62.
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shall be carried out on the basis of international cooperation with
the principle of equality. This principle shall be the key stone [sic]
for the benefit of all mankind ...."74
Other authorities explain that first, although the geostationary
orbit does depend on its relation to phenomena caused by earth,
such phenomena are caused by the entire planet, not just by the
equatorial states. 75 Second, use of the geostationary orbit may be
limited but as a natural resource it cannot be consumed.76 More
importantly, such claims of sovereignty at or above the height at
which satellites can be placed in orbit, effectively defeat the prin-
ciple of freedom of exploration and use set forth in Article I of
the Outer Space Treaty. 77 One author asserts that it stretches the
imagination to claim that freedom of exploration and use applies at
15,000 kilometers or 25,000 kilometers, but not at 35,000 kilome-
ters. 78
It is important to note that the Bogota Declaration, while
vehemently expressing claims of sovereignty over certain portions
of outer space, also states: "The segments of the orbit correspond-
ing to the areas of the high seas beyond the national jurisdiction of
states shall be considered as the Common Heritage of Mankind." 79
Thus it would appear that the eight equatorial states are selectively
expressing their conservative desire to apply territorial sovereignty
in outer space. As for those areas acknowledged to be beyond state
jurisdiction, such as those portions of the orbit over the high seas,
they acknowledge the modern trend toward the community of in-
terest, and toward mankind as the beneficiary of outer space agree-
ments. 8
0
Claiming sovereignty over the geostationary orbit is an appar-
ent attempt by states currently without satellite technology to pro-
tect their territory as against those states with satellite technol-
ogy."' This territorial orientation is clearly a manifestation of the
74. Kosuge, National Appropriation of Geostationary Satellite Orbit, 21ST.
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 31, 32 (1978).
75. Gorbiel, supra note 66, at 176.
76. See Busak, supra note 1, at 31-32.
77. "This attitude of the equatorial states would lead to the consequence that
the principle of freedom of exploration and use of outer space would be ineffec-
tive ...." Arzinger, supra note 68, at 12.
78. Galloway, supra note 68, at 25.
79. Bogota Dec., supra note 62, art. III.
80. See id.
81. N. JASENTULIYANA, supra note 72, at 221.
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nation-state perspective. Such an attempt to carry traditional con-
cepts into the future represents a significant barrier to cooperative
efforts being made in the interest of the international community
in outer space.
IV. THE FUTURE TREND-THE COMMON HERITAGE OF
MANKIND AND THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY TO
PROTECT THE RIGHTS OF MANKIND
Mankind, as opposed to the nation-state, has only recently
been considered the subject of international law. 82 A number of in-
ternational agreements have recognized mankind as the recipient of
rights created or protected,8 3 and the Outer Space Treaty clearly
sets forth mankind as the beneficiary of its provisions. 84 In addi-
tion, various commentators from all parts of the world have ex-
pressed their support for this new role of mankind in international
law, particularly in outer space law. 85 Certainly United States com-
mentators have favored mankind over the nation-state as the sub-
ject of outer space law. 86 One Latin American authority has con-
cluded that outer space law is a new kind of law, the law of
82. See Cocca, Mankind as A New Legal Subject: A New Juridical Dimension
Recognized by the United Nations, 13TH. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 211 (1970); Krstic, Mankind as a Subject of Future Law of Outer Space?,
19TH. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 72 (1976). Contra Arzinger, Le-
gal Aspects of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 22ND. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 89 (1979) (mankind cannot be considered the subject of outer
space law).
83. See, e.g., The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astro-
nauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, supra note 46, pream-
ble: "Wishing to promote international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space, prompted by sentiments of humanity .... ; Convention on the
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, signed Jan. 14, 1975, and entered
into force Sept. 15, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, preamble: "Recognizing
the common interest of all mankind in furthering the exploration and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes ......
84. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 24, preamble.
85. See, e.g., Cocca, Fundamental Principles of Space Law: A Latin-American
Viewpoint, NEW FRONTIERS IN SPACE LAW 61 (E. McWhinney and M. Bradley eds.
1969); Zhukov, Tendencies and Prospects of the Developments of Space Law, id. at
73.
86. See, e.g., Christol, The Legal Common Heritage of Mankind: Capturing an
Illusive Concept and Applying It to World Needs, 18TH. COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 42 (1975); Finch, The Geostationary Orbit and 1967 Outer Space




mankind.8 7 Even Soviet writers have expressed their support for
coordinated efforts concerning the exploration and use of outer
space. 8
Though not universal, support for the Common Heritage of
Mankind is widespread. It is reflected in both official and academic
circles by the recognition of mankind as the subject of the law in
international agreements and by the proliferation of academic en-
deavors advocating such recognition. 89 Such support represents a
departure from territorial sovereignty and a trend toward the appli-
cation of a new non-territorial sovereignty, exercised in the interest
of the international community, to protect the rights of mankind in
outer space. 90
With regard to satellite activity, those opposed to prior con-
sent and to the application of territorial sovereignty in outer space
advocate the Common Heritage of Mankind as the viable sover-
eignty for outer space. 91 Most often cited in support of this view is
Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which states in part: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expressioni this right includes freedom to hold opinions with-
out interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." 92 This docu-
ment embodies the recognition of fundamental human rights and
the inclusion of freedom of information as among those rights. 93
The application of such principles to remote sensing and direct
broadcasting, as well as to outer space activities in general, consti-
tutes a pronouncement of the inapplicability of territorial sover-
eignty in outer space. 94
87. Cocca, supra note 85, at 63.
88. "The Soviet doctrine of space law was opposed from the outset to the na-
tional appropriation of outer space." INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, supra note 2, at
86. See Zhukov, supra note 85, at 77.
89. See notes 82-88 supra and accompanying text.
90. See C. JENKS, supra note 6, at 97-99; S. GOROVE, supra note 35, at 44-46.
91. See S. GOROVE, supra note 35, at 65-78. See also Christol, supra note 86;
Cocca, supra note 82; Finch, supra note 86; Krstic, supra note 82.
92. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR
71 (1948), reprinted in DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 69, at 144.
93. See Dauses, Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellites and Freedom of
Information, 3 J. SPACE L. 59, 67 (1975).
94. See D. SMITH, COMMUNICATION VIA SATELLITE: A VISION IN RETROSPECT
188 (1976); see also Arzinger, supra note 68, at 13; Gorbiel, supra note 66, at 177;
Kosuge, supra note 74, at 33; Wiewiorowska, supra note 52 at 37.
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CONCLUSION
The concept of territorial sovereignty, as exercised by the prin-
ciple of prior consent, is inoperative in outer space because outer
space is free of territorial boundaries. The rights to be created and
protected in outer space are not states' rights but the rights of
mankind, as evidenced by a variety of international agreements.
Thus the concept of sovereignty is evolving from a traditional terri-
torial orientation to a new non-territorial orientation. The new con-
cept of sovereignty holds the rights of man to be more sacred than
the rights of the state and has come to be known as the Common
Heritage of Mankind. It is the Common Heritage of Mankind that
best represents a viable concept of sovereignty for outer space, for
it can best preserve the principle of freedom of exploration and use
which is supported by the overwhelming majority of states.
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